




Health Insurance without Single Crossing
Boone, J.; Schottmuller, C.
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Boone, J., & Schottmuller, C. (2011). Health Insurance without Single Crossing: Why Healthy People have High
Coverage. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-095). Economics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
 





































HEALTH INSURANCE WITHOUT SINGLE CROSSING: 




Jan Boone, Christoph Schottmüller 
July 7, 2011 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-037 
 
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2011-095 
ISSN 0924-7815 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914473 
Health Insurane without Single Crossing:why healthy people have high 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hottmüller†July 7, 2011AbstratStandard insurane models predit that people with high (health) risks have high insuraneoverage. It is empirially doumented that people with high inome have lower health risks andare better insured. We show that inome dierenes between risk types lead to a violation ofsingle rossing in the standard insurane model. If insurers have some market power, this anexplain the empirially observed outome. This observation has also poliy impliations: Whilerisk adjustment is traditionally viewed as an intervention whih inreases eieny and raises theutility of low health agents, we show that with a violation of single rossing a trade o betweene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1. IntrodutionA well doumented problem in health insurane markets with voluntary insurane (like the US) isthat people either have no insurane at all or are underinsured.1 Standard insurane models (inspiredby the seminal work of Rothshild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS) and Stiglitz (1977)) predit that healthypeople have less than perfet insurane or in the extreme no insurane at all. However, both popularaounts like Cohn (2007) and aademi work like Shoen, Collins, Kriss, and Doty (2008) show thatpeople with low health status are overrepresented in the group of uninsured and underinsured.2 Wedevelop a model to explain why sik people end up with little or no insurane. We do this by addingtwo empirial observations (disussed below) to the RS model: (i) riher people tend to be healthierand (ii) health is a normal good. Tehnially speaking, introduing the latter two eets an lead toa violation of single rossing in the model.Another indiation that the standard RS framework (with single rossing) does not apture realitywell is the following. The empirial literature that is based on RS does not unambiguously showthat asymmetri information plays a role in health insurane markets. One would expet people tobe better informed about their health risks than their insurers think for example of preonditions,medial history of parents and other family members or life style. However, some papers, like forexample Cardon and Hendel (2001) or Dowd, Feldman, Cassou, and Finh (1991), do not nd evideneof asymmetri information while others do, e.g. Bajari, Hong, and Khwaja (2006) or Munkin andTrivedi (2010). The test for asymmetri information employed in these papers is the so alled positiveorrelation test, i.e. testing whether riskier types buy more overage.We show that the RS model with a violation of single rossing is apable of explaining why healthypeople have better insurane (in equilibrium) than people with a low health status. In partiular thepositive orrelation property no longer holds if single rossing is violated. Consequently, testing forthis positive orrelation an no longer be viewed as a test for asymmetri information. As mentioned,we use two well doumented stylized fats to motivate this violation of single rossing in the marketfor health insurane.First, riher people fae lower health risks, see for example Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields(2005), Gravelle and Sutton (2009) or Munkin and Trivedi (2010). Potential explanations for this1In empirial studies, underinsurane is dened using indiators of nanial risk. To illustrate, one denition ofunderinsurane used by Shoen, Collins, Kriss, and Doty (2008) is out-of-poket medial expenses for are amountedto 10 perent of inome or more. In our theoretial model, underinsurane refers to less than soially optimal/eientinsurane.2In the words of Shoen, Collins, Kriss, and Doty (2008, pp. w303): underinsurane rates were higher among adultswith health problems than among healthier adults. 2
orrelation between inome and health inlude the following. High inome people are better eduatedand hene know the importane of healthy food, exerise et. Healthy food options tend to be moreexpensive and therefore better aordable to high inome people. Or (with ausality running in theother diretion) healthy people are more produtive and therefore earn higher inomes. Aordingto standard insurane models, this would imply that rih people buy less generous health insurane(ompared to poor people). However, riher people have more generous health insurane, for example,in the form of lower dedutibles or higher overage. Evidene for this an be found in Munkin andTrivedi (2010), Finkelstein and MGarry (2006), Kuttner (1999) or DeNavas-Walt, Protor, and Smith(2008) where the extreme form of underinsurane is emphasized: Low inome itizens are more likelyto have no health insurane at all.The seond stylized fat is that health is a normal good. The eet of inome on treatment hoieis well doumented in the medial literature. The main emphasis in this literature is that patientswith low inome annot aord treatment even if they have a presription by their dotor. Piette,Heisler, and Wagner (2004b, p. 384) for instane report that from a sample of hronially ill diabetespatients A total of 19% of respondents reported utting bak on mediation use in the prior year dueto ost [. . . ℄. Moreover, 28% reported forgoing food or other essentials to pay mediation osts. Byextrapolating from their sample to the US population Piette, Heisler, and Wagner (2004a, p. 1786)onlude that 2.9 million of the 14.1 million Amerian adults with asthma (20%) may be utting bakon their asthma mediation beause of ost pressures. They also doument for a number of hronialonditions that people from low inome groups are muh more likely to report foregoing presribedtreatment due to osts.3 Further examples an, for instane, be found in Goldman, Joye, and Zheng(2007).For the eet of insurane overage on treatment hoie, Shoen, Collins, Kriss, and Doty (2008,pp. w305) report that [b℄ased on a omposite aess indiator that inluded going without at least oneof four needed medial are servies, more than half of the underinsured and two-thirds of the uninsuredreported ost-related aess problems. A similar piture emerges in the international omparison byShoen, Osborn, Squires, Doty, Pierson, and Applebaum (2010).4 Hene, low inome people with highopayments will tend to forego treatment or hoose heaper treatment options.Single rossing means that people with higher health risks have a higher willingness to pay for3For most hroni diseases people with inome less than $ 20000 are roughly 2 (5) times more likely to forego presribedtreatment due to osts than people with an inome between $ 20000 and $ 40000 (more than $ 60000); see table 3 inPiette, Heisler, and Wagner (2004a) for details.4Li and Trivedi (2010) also show that marginal utility of health insurane overage is inuened by both inome andrisk fators. 3
marginally inreasing overage, e.g. reduing opayments. If this property holds for all possibleoverage levels, a given indierene urve of a high risk type an ross a given indierene urve of alow risk type at most one. To see why the stylized fats above an lead to a violation of single rossing,onsider the following. At full overage (indemnity insurane that pays for all medial osts) high risk(low health) types will tend to spend more on treatments than low risk types. Hene a small redutionin overage, leads to a bigger loss in utility for high risk types. Now onsider health insurane withlow overage where the insured faes substantial opayments. Beause health is a normal good, it ispossible that the rih-healthy type spends more on treatment than the low inome, low health type.In that ase, a small hange in overage has a bigger eet on the utility of the healthy type than ofthe low health agent. The healthy type will therefore have a higher willingness to pay for a marginalinrease in overage than the low health type. This violates single rossing.We show that in insurane models without single rossing higher health risks are not neessarilyassoiated with more overage while this predition is inevitable with single rossing. Not only leadsthis to preditions that are loser to empirial observations (as doumented above), it also has learpoliy impliations. We illustrate this with risk adjustment.Risk adjustment is used by the sponsor (government or employer) of a health insurane sheme toredue expeted ost dierenes between types. Based on observable harateristis (like age, genderet.)5 the health insurer is subsidized (taxed/subsidized less) for ustomers with high (low) expetedosts. This is used in a number of ountries like Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland (until 2008),The Netherlands, South Afria and the USA (see Ellis (2007) and Armstrong, Paolui, MLeod, andVan de Ven (2010)) in both mandatory state insurane and voluntary private insurane. The two maingoals of risk adjustment are eieny and fairness (or solidarity); see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) foran overview of the literature on risk adjustment and the way it is used in pratie. Indeed, in thestandard RS model, these two goals go in hand in hand. Starting from zero risk adjustment, inreasingthe subsidy to the high risk onsumer inreases both eieny and the utility of people with low healthstatus. Hene the sponsor of the health insurane sheme does not need to hoose between these twoobjetives. As we show below, this is no longer the ase with a violation of single rossing.In partiular, when single rossing is violated, risk adjustment will either inrease eieny (byreduing o-payments for high risk types) or inrease the utility of high risk types; but not both.Hene when designing the risk adjustment sheme, the sponsor needs to be expliit whether the goal iseieny or solidarity. In other words, with a violation of single rossing there is a trade o betweeneieny and equity.5Clearly, observable harateristis are not a perfet preditor of risk type. Glazer and MGuire (2000) show how theimperfetion of the signals should be taken into aount when designing the risk adjustment sheme.4
The literature on violations of single rossing is relatively sare. There are three papers analyzingperfetly ompetitive insurane markets with 2 × 2 types: People dier in two dimensions and bothdimensions an either take a high or a low value. In Smart (2000) the two dimensions are risk and riskaversion. Netzer and Sheuer (2010) model an additional labor supply deision and the two dimensionsare produtivity and risk. Wambah (2000) models both wealth and risk. All papers have a poolingresult, i.e. if single rossing does not hold two of the four types an be pooled. Our paper ontributesby deviating from the perfet ompetition assumption. We show that under imperfet ompetitiontypes annot only be pooled but high risk types might get even less overage in equilibrium than lowrisk types.Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie (2007) take a dierent approah to answer the question why high risktypes might have lower overage in general insurane markets. They use a model where types dierin risk aversion and single rossing is satised. Hene, types with higher risk aversion will have moreoverage in equilibrium. At the same time more risk averse agents might engage more in preventivebehavior. If types are still separated in equilibrium and risk aversion dierenes remain the drivingfore, high risk aversion types will exhibit less risk (due to prevention) and higher overage. Similarlines of reasoning an be found in Hemenway (1990) and De Meza and Webb (2001).Sine risk in the health setor is exogenously dierent for dierent persons (e.g. due to genetis),we follow RS and take a dierent starting point than Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie (2007). We assumerisk dierenes instead of risk aversion dierenes. The result that high risk people have low overageis in our paper not the result of low risk aversion. The driving fore is the violation of single rossingaused by empirially doumented inome dierenes between high risks and low risks.Finally, our paper is related to the industrial eonomis literature on non-linear priing in oligopoly(see, for instane, Armstrong and Vikers (2001), Stole (1995) and Stole (2007)). This literature fouseson the welfare eets of non-linear priing in imperfetly ompetitive markets. Our ontribution tothis literature is to do omparative stati analysis with respet to risk adjustment. In other words, ourpaper has positive (testable) impliations for non-linear priing in oligopoly. Moreover, whereas theinsurane papers mentioned above fous on either perfet ompetition or monopoly, we atually analyzeall three ases: perfet ompetition, monopoly and oligopoly. As one would expet, the assumptionson the ompetitive situation matter for the results.In the following setion, the model is introdued and illustrated with an example. Then equilibriumin monopoly and oligopoly is derived. Thereafter we introdue risk adjustment and show the trade obetween eieny and solidarity in ase single rossing is violated. We onlude with the impliationsof our model for so alled advantageous seletion. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.5
2. Insurane modelThis setion introdues a general model of health insurane that allows us to onsider both the asewhere single rossing (SC) is satised and the ase where it is not satised (NSC). The setion onludeswith a model where SC is not satised beause of inome dierenes between onsumer types. Whereasthe RS model predits that people with high expeted health are expenditures have generous overagein their insurane, we allow for the ase that these people annot aord suh generous insurane.Following RS, we onsider an agent with utility funtion u(q, p, θ) where q ∈ [0, 1] denotes overageor generosity of her insurane ontrat,6 p ≥ 0 denotes the prie of insurane (insurane premium) and
θ ∈ {θl, θh} with θh > θl > 0 denotes the type of onsumer.7 Higher θ denotes a higher risk in thesense of higher expeted osts (in ase qh = ql = 1; see below). This ould, for instane, be the asedue to hroni illness or higher risk due to a geneti preondition. We make the following assumptionson the utility funtion.Assumption 1 The utility funtion u(q, p, θ) is ontinuous and dierentiable. It satises uq > 0, up <
0. We dene the indierene urve p(q, u, θ) as follows:
u(q, p(q, u, θ), θ) ≡ u (1)We assume that these indierene urves p(q, u, θ) are dierentiable in q and u with pq = −uq/up >
0, pu = 1/up < 0.Further, the rossing at q = 1 satises:
pq(1, u
h, θh) > pq(1, u
l, θl) (C1)for all ul ≥ ūl = u(0, 0, θl), uh ≥ ūh = u(0, 0, θh).In words, utility u is inreasing in overage q and dereasing in the premium p paid for insurane.For given type θ and utility level u, the indierene urve p(q, u, θ) maps out ombinations (q, p) thatyield the same utility. Beause higher q leads to higher utility, p inreases to keep utility onstant.Hene, indierene urves are upward sloping in (q, p) spae (pq > 0). Inreasing u (for given q)requires a lower prie. Thus, raising u shifts an indierene urve downwards (pu < 0).6Apart from literal overage where 1 − q denotes the agent's opayments q ould, for example, be interpreted as
1/(1 + dedutible). Note that in models without moral hazard both parameters are similar in the sense that high risktypes dislike o-payments and dedutibles more relative to low risk types.7We follow RS and muh of the risk adjustment literature in assuming that there are only two types. For an analysisof a violation of single rossing with a ontinuum of types θ, see Araujo and Moreira (2010) and Shottmüller (2011).6
Type k ∈ {h, l} buys insurane if it leads to a higher utility than her outside option ūk. Thisoutside option is given by the empty insurane ontrat: q = p = 0.At q = 1 a marginal redution in q should be ompensated by a bigger derease in p for θh omparedto θl. This reets the fat that the θh type faes higher expeted health are expenditures. At q = 1,i.e. at full overage, other fators like willingness to pay for treatment (whih ould be dierent fordierent types) play no role. In this sense, this assumption denes what higher θ means: at q = 1,higher θ types fae higher expeted osts. With the same idea we assume that expeted osts for theinsurer of a ontrat with q = 1 is higher for the θh than for the θl type: c(1, uh, θh) > c(1, ul, θl) forall uh ≥ ūh, ul ≥ ūl. Intuitively, u should not matter for health are onsumption at full overage andthe high risk type will use the insurane more.To allow for inome eets (for instane, in treatment hoie; see below) the ost funtion dependson u. However, we assume two regularity onditions.Assumption 2 For eah type k ∈ {h, l} and q ∈ [0, 1] we assume that
• cu(q, u
k, θk) ≥ 0 for uk ≥ ūk,
• c(1, uk, θk) = c(1, ũk, θk), for uk, ũk ≥ ūk.In words, as the inome of the agent inreases (whih eteris paribus leads to higher utility), theagent has more money to spend on treatment. As the insurer pays a fration q ≥ 0 of these treatments,this leads to (weakly) higher osts for the insurer. Seond, osts at full overage (q = 1) do not varyin utility. Intuitively, if q = 1 treatments are for free for the agent and there is no reason to forgotreatments, irrespetive of the level of uk ≥ ūk.8Beause of (C1), the single rossing ondition reads9
pq(q, u
h, θh) > pq(q, u
l, θl) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1] (SC)and uh ≥ ūh, ul ≥ ūl suh that p(q, uh, θh) = p(q, ul, θl). The intuition is the following. Supposean indierene urve of type θh intersets with an indierene urve of type θl in some point (p, q).Then (SC) implies that the slope of the θh indierene urve will be higher. It follows that these twoindierene urves an interset only one.We onsider both the ase where (SC) is satised and the ase where it is violated (denoted byNSC). In both the SC and NSC ases, we maintain the assumption that q = 1 is the eient insuranelevel (EI) for eah type θ ∈ {θl, θh}.8By assumption 3 full overage is soially desirable. Hene we do not onsider the ase where insurane leads toineieny by induing over-onsumption of treatments.9This is also alled sorting, onstant sign or Spene-Mirrlees ondition (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 259)).7
Assumption 3 For a given utility level uk, welfare (and therefore prots) are maximized at full ov-erage, i.e.
max
q∈[0,1]
p(q, uk, θk)− c(q, uk, θk) (EI)is maximized by q = 1 for eah k ∈ {h, l} and uk ≥ ūk.This basially means that the insurane motive, i.e. transferring risk from a risk averse agent to arisk neutral insurer, is not overruled by other onsiderations. To illustrate, we do not assume that thelow inome agent's preferene for health/treatment is so low that foregoing insurane would be soiallyoptimal. Put dierently, we assume that full insurane is soially desirable. Underinsuranewith noinsurane as extreme aseresults therefore not from rst best but from informational distortions andprie disrimination motives.Our motivation for making this assumption is twofold. First, this assumption simply normalizesthe soially eient insurane level in the same way as in RS. Hene, we only deviate from the RSset up by allowing for both SC and NSC. Seond, we want to argue that under realisti assumptions,
θh types have less than full insurane. If the optimal insurane level is atually below one, than thisresult would follow rather trivially.The literature on insurane models onsiders mostly perfet ompetition.10 We show that with theassumptions made so far, perfet ompetition implies qh = 1 (even if (SC) is not satised). Hene,market power on the insurane side is needed to get qh < 1. Following the RS denition of the perfetompetition equilibrium, we require that (i) eah oered ontrat makes nonnegative prots and (ii)given the equilibrium ontrats there is no other ontrat yielding positive prots.Proposition 1 If an equilibrium exists under perfet ompetition then qh = 1.As is well known, existene of equilibrium in the RS framework is not guaranteed. Equilibrium doesnot exist if the only possible (separating) equilibrium is broken by a pooling ontrat. If the frationof θh type agents in the population is high enough, then suh a deviation to a pooling ontrat is notprotable and an equilibrium exists. If an equilibrium exists, it has qh = 1.The proposition shows that even with violations of single rossing, high risk types will get (weakly)higher overage than low risk types. Hene we need to deviate from perfet ompetition to get qh < ql.This proposition is in some sense reminisent of Wambah (2000), Smart (2000) and Netzer and Sheuer(2010): these papers analyze perfetly ompetitive insurane markets and a reverse order, i.e. riskiertypes have less overage, is impossible in these papers.10See Jak (2006) and Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2007) for exeptions using a Hotelling model to formalize marketpower on the insurer side of the market. These papers assume that (SC) is satised and hene nd eient insuranefor the θh type. 8
Corollary 1 Whenever qh < ql is observed, insurers have market power.Although previous models of insurane markets assume perfet ompetition, reent researh forthe US (see Dafny (2010)) shows that health insurers do have market power. More generally, in mostountries where health insurane is provided by private ompanies, these rms tend to be big (due toeonomies of sale in risk diversiation). Hene one would expet them to have some market power.In order to analyse the ontrats oered by insurers with market power, we expliitly introdue theinentive ompatibility (IC) onstraints for eah type
p(ql, ul, θl) ≥ p(ql, uh, θh) (ICh)
p(qh, uh, θh) ≥ p(qh, ul, θl) (ICl)The rst onstraint implies that the ontrat intended for θh (i.e. (qh, p(qh, uh, θh))) lies on a(weakly) lower indierene urve for θh than the ontrat that is meant for the θl type (ql, p(ql, ul, θl)).That is, the inequality implies u(qh, ph, θh) ≥ u(ql, pl, θh) where pi = p(qi, ui, θi) with i ∈ {h, l}.Similarly, the seond inequality implies that u(ql, pl, θl) ≥ u(qh, ph, θl).Irrespetive of the mode of ompetition and whether (SC) holds, we have the following result thatwe use below.Lemma 1 At least one type has full overage. If the types are separated under the optimal ontratsheme (ql, pl), (qh, ph) with ql 6= qh, then at most one inentive onstraint binds.We onlude this setion with a model where SC is violated due to dierenes in inome betweentypes. The idea of the model is that for q < 1 people have to nane part of the osts of treatment outof their own poket and low inome agents may deide to hoose heaper treatment or forgo treatmentaltogether. This eet is doumented in the medial literature, see for example Piette, Heisler, andWagner (2004b), Piette, Heisler, and Wagner (2004a) or Goldman, Joye, and Zheng (2007).In partiular, we assume that a type θ onsumer faes health shok s ∈ [0, 1] with distribution(density) funtion F (s|θ)(f(s|θ)). We take s = 1 as the state in whih the agent is healthy and needsno treatment. Lower health states s orrespond to worse health. The assumption that the θh type hasworse health than the θl type an now be stated as F (s|θh) > F (s|θl) for eah s ∈ 〈0, 1〉. In words,low s states are more likely for the θh then for the θl type.One an agent reeives a health shok s < 1 she an inrease her health by treatment h ∈ H(s) tohealth level s + h, where H(s) denotes the set of possible treatments in state s. We assume that theset H(s) is ompat and s + h ≤ 1 for eah h ∈ H(s) and eah s ∈ [0, 1]. That is, treatment annotlead to higher health states than not falling ill. If H(s) is a singleton, the onsumer has no treatment9
hoie. If the set H(s) has more than one element, low inome onsumers with partial insurane, i.e.
q < 1, may deide to hoose heaper treatment than if they have full insurane, i.e. q = 1. We dene
h̄(s) = max{h ∈ H(s)} as the best possible treatment and assume that h̄(s) is non-inreasing in s.This means that a less aited agent (high s < 1) annot inrease his health by treatment more thanan agent who is more seriously ill (low s). If 0 ∈ H(s), an agent an forgo treatment altogether.Let w(θ) denote the wealth (or inome) of a type θ agent. Then we write
u(q, p, θ) =
∫ 1
0
{v(w(θ) − p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s + h(s, q, θ))}dF (s|θ)where h(s, q, θ) is dened as:
h(s, q, θ) = arg max
h∈H(s)
v(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h, s + h)
(2)where v(y, h) is the utility funtion of an agent whih depends on onsumption of other goods (y) andhealth (h). We assume that v(y, h) satises vy, vh > 0, vyy , vhh < 0 and that health is a normal good:
vhy ≥ 0. That is, utility inreases in both health and onsumption of other goods at a dereasing rate.As inome inreases, people's preferene for health inreases as well. Further, we assume that inomeand health status are negatively orrelated: w(θh) ≤ w(θl). This negative orrelation is empiriallydoumented, for example, in Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields (2005), Gravelle and Sutton (2009)or Munkin and Trivedi (2010).Using this notation we an write
c(q, u, θ) = q
∫ 1
0
h(s, q, θ)dF (s|θ) (3)The rst order ondition for an interior solution h(s, q, θ) ∈ H(s) an be written as
(1− q)vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+ h(s, q, θ)) = vh(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s+h(s, q, θ)) (4)To see the impliations of this model for single rossing, onsider the slope of the indierene urvesin (q, p)-spae:





0 vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s + h(s, q, θ))h(s, q, θ)dF (s|θ)
∫ 1
0 vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s + h(s, q, θ))dF (s|θ)
(5)In words, the slope pq equals the weighted average of treatment h(s, q, θ) over the states s with weight
vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s + h(s, q, θ))f(s|θ)
∫ 1
0 vy(w(θ)− p− (1− q)h(s, q, θ), s + h(s, q, θ))dF (s|θ)
(6)on state s (where the weights integrate to 1).
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To illustrate (C1) assume that s+ h̄(s) = 1 (treatment makes a patient healthy again),11 then it isroutine to verify that
pq(1, u, θ) =
∫ 1
0 vy(w(θ)− p, 1)h̄(s)dF (s|θ)
∫ 1




(1− s)dF (s|θ)where the last equality follows from the fat that vy(w(θ)−p, 1) is onstant in s. Note that we use herethat h(s, 1, θ) = h̄(s) for both types. If treatment is free (q = 1) eah agent uses the highest treatment(h̄(s)). The stohasti dominane assumption implies that θh puts more weight on low s states (where
h̄(s) = 1− s is high) ompared to θl. Hene under these assumptions, ondition (C1) is satised.(SC) is satised if there are no wealth dierenes between types, i.e. w(θh) = w(θl), and H(s)satises some regularity ondition. The idea is that without wealth dierenes, (4) yields for bothtypes the same optimal treatment. Put dierently, h(s, q, θ) is independent of θ. If patients hoosemore treatment in worse health states, single rossing will be satised: due to stohasti dominane, θhtypes have higher weight (6) on low s states with high h(s). Hene pq in (5) is higher for θh than for θltypes for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Treatment h(s, q, θ) is indeed non-inreasing in s if H(s) is well behaved: H(s)is onvex for eah s and non-inreasing in s.12 It then follows from equation (4) using the impliitfuntion theorem that
(−(1− q)2vyy + 2(1− q)vyh − vhh)
dh
ds




−(1− q)vyy + vhy
−(1− q)2vyy + 2(1− q)vyh − vhh
> 0 (8)Hene, if h(s, q, θl) ∈ H(s) is an interior maximum, the θh type tends to hoose lower treatment h.In words, sine a fration 1 − q of the treatment ost has to be paid by the insured, a low inome
θh patient may hoose heaper treatment than the riher θl type (as health is a normal good). Sine11Alternatively, we an assume that h̄′(s) ∈ 〈−1, 0〉 suh that s + h̄(s) is inreasing in s. In words, if an agent fallsill, treatment does not bring bak full health. Then a suient ondition for (C1) is vyyh ≥ 0: Suppose it were the asethat h̄′(s) = 0, then pq(1, ·) would be the same for both types. h̄′(s) < 0 will now put more weight on low states (as
h̄(s2) ≤ h̄(s1) for s1 ≤ s2). vyyh ≥ 0 guarantees that vy is inreasing less in s for the high type. Hene, putting moreweight on low states where vy is low aets the θl type less than the θh type. Consequently, (C1) is satised.12We say that the set H(s) is non-inreasing in s if for eah s1, s2 with s1 ≤ s2 we have that for eah h ∈ H(s2) thereexists h′ ∈ H(s1) suh that h′ ≥ h. As a speial ase this inludes the possibility that H(s) = h(s) is a singleton, with
h′(s) < 0. 11
he does not utilize the insurane as muh as the (rih) low risk type, type θh has a lower marginalwillingness to pay for insurane overage (for q lose to zero). However, for high levels of overage, i.e.
q lose to 1, wealth dierenes matter less in the treatment hoie beause the patient does not haveto pay (muh) for the treatment. Consequently, although (C1) is satised with w(θh) < w(θl), (SC)an be violated.Hene, this model where agents dier in inome and treatment hoie h ∈ H(s) is endogenousan generate the violation of (SC) mentioned above. In the next setion, we give a numerial examplewhere (SC) is indeed violated. 3. ExampleAs an example of an utility funtion that satises the assumptions (C1) and (EI) above and violates(SC), onsider the following mean-variane utility set up.13There are two states of the world: An agent either falls ill or stays healthy. The probabilityof falling ill is denoted by F h (F l < F h) for type θh (θl). In the numerial example, we hoose
F h = 0.07 > 0.05 = F l. One an agent falls ill, the set of possible treatments is denoted by H = {h, h̄}.The utility of an agent of type i = h, l with treatment hoie h ∈ {h, h̄} is written as:
u(q, p, θi) = F i(v(h, θi)− (1− q)h) + (1− F i)v(1, θi)− p
−12r
iF i(1− F i)(v(1, θi)− v(h, θi) + (1− q)h)2
(9)where v(h, θi) denotes the utility for type i = h, l of having health h and ri > 0 denotes the degree ofrisk aversion. Hene an agent's utility is given by the expeted utility minus 12ri times the variane inthe agent's utility. This is a simple way to apture that the agent is risk averse.14Along an indierene urve where u is xed, we nd the following slope:
dp
dq
= F ih(q, θi) + riF i(1− F i)(v(1, θi)− v(h(q, θi), θi) + (1− q)h(q, θi))h(q, θi) (10)13For the Python ode used to generate this example, see:http://sites.google.om/site/janboonehomepage/home/webappendies.14When an agent of type i buys a produt at prie p that gives utility v, there are two ways to apture the marginalutility of inome for agent i. First, overall utility an be written as v − αip where v is the same for eah type i and
αi an dier. Low inome types are then modelled to have high αi; high marginal utility of inome. Alternatively, onean write vi − αp where α is the same for all types. Then low inome types have low vi. We have hosen the latterformalization with α = 1. The assumption that treatment is a normal good is then implemented by assuming that
v(h̄, θh)− v(h, θh) < v(h̄, θl)− v(h, θl).12
where h(q, θi) is the solution for h solving
max
h∈{h,h̄}
v(h, θi)− (1− q)hIn words, one an agent falls ill, she deides whih treatment to hoose based on the benet v(h, θi)and the out-of-poket expenses (1− q)h.With the parameter values that we onsider below, it is the ase that
rhF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h̄, θh))h̄ = rlF l(1− F l)(v(1, θl)− v(h̄, θl))h̄ (11)In words, at q = 1 (where both types hoose the highest treatment h̄) the variane terms in the slope
dp/dq (equation (10)) are equalized. Hene assumption (C1) is satised beause F hh̄ > F lh̄.For the numerial example we assume h̄ = 0.6, h = 0.2 and the assoiated utilities for the θhtype equal v(1, θh) = 0.9, v(h̄, θh) = 0.7, v(h, θh) = 0.45 and similarly for the θl type: v(1, θl) =
1.1, v(h̄, θl) = 0.9, v(h, θl) = 0.5. Hene, having high health is more important for the θl type omparedto the θh type. This implies that θl type is willing to spend more on treatment than the θh type. Sine
0.9 − 0.6 ≥ 0.5 − 0.2 the θl type hooses h̄ even if q = 0 (and the inequality is strit for q > 0). Thisimplies that ondition (EI) is satised for the θl type as q does not aet treatment hoie and higher
q leads to more insurane (provided by a risk neutral insurer). The θh type hooses h̄ if q = 1 butprefers h for low values of q. In partiular, for q = 0 we have v(h̄, θh)− h̄ < v(h, θh)− h. Let q̃ denotethe value for q suh that the θh type is indierent between treatment h̄ and h:
v(h̄, θh)− (1− q̃)h̄ = v(h, θh)− (1− q̃)h (12)To verify that (EI) is satised for the θh type, we proeed in two steps. First, onsider q > q̃ suh that
h(q, θh) = h̄. Then inreasing overage q redues the variane in utility for the risk averse θh type andhene (EI) is satised for q > q̃. Now onsider q < q̃ suh that h(q, θh) = h. In order to satisfy (EI), itmust be the ase that prots (prie minus expeted osts) when oering full overage are higher thanprots when oering a partial overage ontrat yielding the same utility. This an be written as:
F h(v(h̄, θh)− h̄) + (1− F h)v(1, θh)− uh − 12r
hF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h̄, θh)2 ≥
F h(v(h, θh)− h) + (1− F h)v(1, θh)− uh − 12r
hF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h, θh) + (1− q)h)2Note that the right hand side of this inequality inreases in q and hene is highest at q̃. In our numerialexample, we hoose rh suh that the inequality holds with equality at q = q̃.15 This implies that it issatised for all q ≤ q̃ and hene (EI) is satised.15Given this value of rh, rl is hosen to satisfy equation (11).13
With the parameter values above, it is routine to verify that (SC) is violated. Figure 1 below showstwo indierene urves for the θl type (in red) and one for the θh type (in blue). Indeed, for q < q̃ theindierene urve for the θl type is steeper than for the θh type. This is due to the fat that the θltype buys the expensive treatment h̄ while the θh type buys h. The kink in the indierene urve forthe θh type happens at q̃ where the θh type swithes from the heap to the more expensive treatment.Hene small inreases in q for q > q̃ are worth more to the θh type than small inreases in q < q̃. Infat, the gure shows that for q > q̃, the indierene urve for the θh type is steeper than the one forthe θl type. This is the violation in single rossing.Hene in a simple mean-variane utility framework, it is straightforward and intuitive to generatea violation of (SC). 4. Insurane market monopolyThis setion derives a simple result in a monopoly setting within the general redued form frameworkof setion 2. The motivation for analyzing the monopoly ase is proposition 1: An equilibrium with
qh < ql an only exist if insurane ompanies have market power. Although the extreme ase of amonopoly is not very realisti, it allows to derive a lear ut result and gives some intuition for themore realisti ase of an oligopoly whih will be analyzed in the following setion.Proposition 2 The type with the highest willingness to pay for full overage, i.e. the type θk withhighest p(1, ūk, θk), obtains a full overage ontrat in an insurane monopoly. Either his inentiveompatibility or his individual rationality onstraint is binding (or both). The other type's individualrationality onstraint is binding.Let θk denote the type with the highest willingness to pay for full overage. It follows from theproposition that θk obtains a ontrat (q, p) = (1, pk) for some pk ≤ p(1, ūk, θk). The monopolyoutome is now pinned down by the hoie of pk. If pk = p(1, ūk, θk), then both individual rationalityonstraints are binding. In this ase, type θ−k might be exluded, i.e. θ−k gets the ontrat (0, 0).If pk = p(1, ū−k, θ−k), both types are pooled. If pk ∈ 〈p(1, ū−k, θ−k), p(1, ūk, θk)〉, the equilibriumseparates the types and θ−k gets an insurane ontrat with partial overage. The optimal level of pkis determined by the share of θk types in the population.A diret impliation of proposition 2 is that high risk types will always have full overage if singlerossing is satised. To see this, note that the indierene urve orresponding to ūk (that is theindividual rationality onstraint) goes through the origin (p, q) = (0, 0) for both types. With (SC) the14
indierene urve of the high risk type is steeper and lies therefore above the individual rationalityonstraint of the low risk type for all overage levels.Without single rossing this is no longer the ase. Figure 1 shows indeed that in our numerialexample the low risk type has a higher willingness to pay for full overage than the high risk type.Therefore, a monopolist will give full overage to low risk types in our example. If the types areseparated, we nd that qh < ql = 1.5. Insurane market oligopolyThis setion haraterizes equilibrium in a duopoly insurane market. Again the general redued formmodel introdued in setion 2 is used. We illustrate with the example from setion 3 that equilibriawith qh < ql exist if single rossing is violated.There are three reasons why we hoose to onsider an oligopoly insurane market. First, proposition1 shows that with perfet ompetition it is impossible to have qh < 1. Seond, as mentioned above,assuming a monopoly market is not very realisti. We are not aware of a ountry where health insuraneis provided privately by a monopolist. Third, in ountries like Germany or the Netherlands, insuraneis mandatory and the government runs a risk adjustment sheme. The next setion analyzes the eetsof risk adjustment on eieny and solidarity. If there is mandatory insurane, risk adjustment hasno eet on the outome at all in ase of monopoly. The reason is that the monopolist serves all typesand hene risk adjustment is a lump sum transfer for a monopolist insurer. As we show below, riskadjustment (even if the whole market is served, as with mandatory insurane) does aet the marketoutome in ase of oligopoly.The demand share of insurer j ∈ {a, b}'s produt on market i ∈ {h, l} is written as D(uij, ui−j) ∈









−j) < 0An insurer gains market share if it oers onsumers higher utility and loses market share if its opponentoers higher utility. Let φ ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of θh types in the population.16See Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart (2011) for an analysis where θh and θl have dierent demand elastiities.
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h, uh, θh)− c(qh, uh, θh))
+ (1− φ)D(ul, ulb)(p(q
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We fous on a symmetri pure strategy equilibrium of this problem where uha = uhb = uh, ula =
ulb = u




) with uhb = uh and ulb = ul. We assume that problem (Puh,ul) is onave suh that a solutionis haraterized by the rst order onditions for qh, ql, uh, ul:17
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µh > 0 and p(ql, ul, θl) = p(ql, uh, θh)






µh = 0 and p(ql, ul, θl) ≥ p(ql, uh, θh)




). However, it is moreonveniently stated after some more notation is introdued. This is done in equations (30) and (33) below.16
(P) (uhP , qhP , ulP , qlP ) solves (13)-(16) with µh = µl = 0.It is straightforward to verify that in ase of pooling (P) we have qhP = qlP = 1. However, weare interested in the ase where qh 6= ql (as this is the relevant ase in pratie). Further, below weonsider the role of risk adjustment to enhane eieny. This is only relevant for the ase wherefor one type we have q < 1. Hene we will ignore the pooling ase from here onwards and fous onseparating equilibria (H) and (L).The following proposition derives suient onditions for an (H) and (L) equilibrium.Proposition 3 With single rossing, solution (H) is a symmetri equilibrium and we have qh = 1 > ql.If single rossing is not satised and
• the solution (uhH , qhH , ulH , qlH) under (H) above satises
p(1, uhH , θ











l))dq ≥ 0 (19)then this solution is a symmetri equilibrium and we have qh = 1 > ql
• the solution (uhL, qhL, ulL, qlL) under (L) above satises
p(1, ulL, θ











h))dq ≥ 0 (20)then this solution is a symmetri equilibrium and we have ql = 1 > qh.The ondition (19) [(20)℄ in the (H) [(L)℄ outome makes sure that (ICl) [(ICh)℄ is satised aswell. If (SC) is satised, equation (ICl) is automatially satised for the following reason. Beause ofinentive ompatibility, the two equilibrium indierene urves have to ross somewhere. Under (SC)the high type's indierene urve is steeper there (and onsequently above the low type's urve forslightly higher q). By (SC) there is no other intersetion and therefore the high type's indiereneurve is above the low type's also at q = 1. Hene ondition (19) is satised. Without single rossing,the θh indierene urve is less steep than the θl indierene urve for low q and the other way aroundfor q lose to 1. In that ase, we need to hek expliitly in the solution whether the IC onstraint thatwas ignored is indeed satised.To prove existene of the (H) and (L) equilibria in an oligopoly framework, it is suient to givean example for eah. The existene of (H) equilibria in oligopoly is already established in the literaturethrough models satisfying the single rossing assumption, see for example Olivella and Vera-Hernández(2007). Here we give an example using the utility setup of setion 3 to demonstrate existene of a(L) equilibrium with oligopoly. Reall from proposition 1 that there is no (L) equilibrium with perfetompetition. 17
Example (ont.) On the supply side we assume that there are two insurers loated at the endpoints 0 and 1 of a Hotelling line. Agents are uniformly distributed over the [0, 1] interval. An agentat position x ∈ [0, 1] inurs transportation ost xt ((1 − x)t) when buying from insurer a (b). Eahinsurer oers a menu of ontrats {(qh, ph), (ql, pl), (0, 0)} where the rst ontrat is intended for the
θh type, the seond for the θl type and the third ontrat denotes the agent's outside option of notbuying insurane at all (whih will not be used in equilibrium).We will show that it is straightforward to nd examples with a (L) equilibrium. The easiest way to dothis is to nd parameter values suh that the individual rationality (IR) urve (that is, the indiereneurve p(q, ū, θ)) for the θl type lies everywhere above the IR urve for the θh type. As shown in gure 1this is the ase for the parameter values hosen in setion 3. Clearly the Hotelling equilibrium ontratshave to lie on or below the relevant IR urves.First, assume that φ = 0. In words, there are only θl types. Then it is routine to verify that ql = 1(beause of assumption 3) and the Hotelling equilibrium prie on the θl-market equals pl = F lh̄ + t.18This ontrat is denoted (1, pl) in gure 1 for the parameter values in setion 3 and t = 0.018. As thisontrat lies below θl's IR urve it is, indeed, the equilibrium outome. Let ulhotel. denote θl's utilitylevel assoiated with the (1, pl) ontrat: ulhotel. = u(1, pl, θl). Contrat (qh, ph) (although not boughtby anyone as φ = 0) is dened by the intersetion of indierene urve p(q, ulhotel., θl) (dashed urvein the gure) and θh's IR urve. This is the best ontrat on θh's IR urve that satises θl's inentiveompatibility onstraint.Now inrease φ slightly to φ > 0 (but small). We laim that this results in a (L) equilibrium with
ql = 1 > qh. For this to be an equilibrium we need that the indierene urve for the θl type at q = 1lies above the indierene urve for the θh type at q = 1. Note that the equilibrium indierene urvefor the θh type (p(q, uhhotel, θh)) annot lie above θh's IR urve. Hene a suient ondition for a (L)equilibrium is that θl's indierene urve p(q, ulhotel., θl) at the new Hotelling equilibrium lies above θh's
IR urve at q = 1. We formally show that this is the ase in lemma 3 in the appendix. Intuitively,small hanges in φ will lead to small hanges in the indierene urve p(q, ulhotel., θl). As this urve isabove θh's IR urve at q = 1 in ase φ = 0, it will be above θh's IR urve for small positive values of
φ. Hene a straightforward way to generate (L) equilibria is to nd examples where the IR onstraintfor the θl type lies above the IR onstraint for the θh type for eah q ∈ 〈0, 1]. Then there exist t > 0and φ > 0 suh that the example has an (L) equilibrium.Having proved the existene of a (L) equilibrium, we move to the poliy impliations of suh an18Reall that in a Hotelling model with onstant marginal osts c, the equilibrium prie is given by c + t. See, forinstane, Tirole (1988, pp. 280). 18











Figure 1: Example with parameter values in setion 3 and t = 0.018equilibrium. 6. Risk adjustmentAbove we have shown that an equilibrium an exist where θh types have less than full insurane. Thisis in line with the empirial ndings mentioned in the introdution where people with low inome andlow health status have less generous insurane than people with high inome and good health. In thissetion, we show what the poliy impliations are of an equilibrium with qh < 1. In partiular, riskadjustment is often presented as a win-win poliy: Starting from a separating equilibrium it inreasesboth the utility of people with bad health (solidarity with those unluky enough to be born this way)19and it inreases equilibrium overage (eieny).That is, when it omes to risk adjustment, there is no trade o between eieny and distributionalobjetives for the government. The papers and ountry poliies surveyed in Van de Ven and Ellis (2000)see risk adjustment as serving both eieny and fairness or solidarity. We show below that under a19The underlying assumption is that the θh type was born with, say a hroni disease like diabetes. Hene θh's highexpeted health are osts are exogenously given. Then fairness or solidarity onsiderations an lead the planner to givea higher weight than λ to the θh type in the objetive funtion. Alternatively, high health are osts an be endogenousdue to, for example, smoking behavior, food habits, drug use et. See Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) for a disussion ofthe limits to solidarity due to suh moral hazard eets. 19





















l) + ρl) (21)where we use the following denition of the funtions π (with a slight abuse of notation) apturing theprot margins on the θh and θl markets resp.:
π(uh, θh) = p(1, uh, θh)− c(1, uh, θh)
π(ul, uh, θl) = p(ql(ul, uh), ul, θl)− c(ql(ul, uh), ul, θl)
(22)with ql(ul, uh) the value of ql that solves equation (ICh) with equality. If (SC) is satised, dierentiatingthe binding (ICh) yields
(
pq(q





l, ul, θl)and hene
dql
dul
< 0 (23)sine the left hand side is negative by (SC) and the right hand side is positive by assumption 1 (pu < 0).Using a similar derivation, one an show in this ase that
dql
duh
> 0 (24)In words, inreasing uh relaxes the (ICh) onstraint thereby allowing for higher ql (for given ul).Inreasing ul does the opposite and hene leads to lower ql (for given uh).20Selden (1998) makes this point using a model with perfet ompetition where single rossing holds.21This assumption is usually justied by assuming that the government has (ex post) more information than the insurerex ante. Hene the insurer is not able to (expliitly) selet risks ex ante but the government an perfetly risk adjust expost. Alternatively, the insurer has the relevant information but is prevented by law to at upon this information. Toillustrate, in the Netherlands an insurer annot refuse a ustomer who wants to buy a ertain insurane ontrat. Asmentioned, Glazer and MGuire (2000) show how optimal risk adjustment an work with imperfet signals of ustomers'types. In the latter ase, the government annot perfetly observe eah ustomer's type.20





















l) + ρl) (25)where we use the following denition of the funtions π̃:
π̃(ul, θl) = p(1, ul, θl)− c(1, ul, θl)
π̃(uh, ul, θh) = p(qh(uh, ul), uh, θh)− c(qh(uh, ul), uh, θh)







(27)In this ase, raising ul relaxes the (ICl) onstraint and hene allows for higher qh (for given uh).Let Πi denote the derivative of Π with respet to its i-th argument. Then for the (H) ase, asymmetri equilibrium (fousing on an interior maximum) is haraterized by Π1 = Π2 = 0 whih wewrite as
φD1(u
h, uh)(π(uh, θh) + ρh) + φD(uh, uh)π1(u
h, θh) + (1− φ)D(ul, ul)π2(u




l, ul)(π(ul, uh, θl) + ρl) +D(ul, ul)π1(u
l, uh, θl)
)
= 0 (29)together with the seond order onditions:




(30)The interpretation of the rst order ondition with respet to uha (equation (28)) is as follows. Byinreasing uha slightly, insurer a inreases the demand for its produt on the θh market on whih itearns the margin πh + ρh. On the inframargin, however, inreasing uh (or equivalently reduing ph)leads to lower prots (π1 < 0). Finally, there is the eet of uh on the θl market. By inreasing uh,the rm an raise ql and still satisfy (ICh). Hene uh aets the prots on the θl market.The rst order ondition with respet to ul (equation (29)) only features the marginal and infra-marginal eets on the θl market.In the (L) ase, we have Π̃1 = Π̃2 = 0 whih we write as
φD1(u
h, uh)(π̃(uh, ul, θh) + ρh) + φD(uh, uh)π̃1(u












h) = 0 (32)21
together with the seond order onditions:











j) = 1for i = h, l. Consider hanges in risk adjustment with a xed budget: dρh = dρ, dρl = − φ1−φdρ suhthat





< 0 (35)Health insurane is a produt of whih one buys one unit or zero. In fat, it is often not allowedto buy more than one insurane ontrat due to moral hazard problems (see Pauly (1974)). We followthe literature on ompetition with prie disrimination and assume that both markets are fully overed(this is alled full sale ompetition by Shmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999) and pure ompetitionby Stole (1995)). When risk adjustment is implemented at the ountry level, it usually goes handin hand with mandatory insurane (e.g. as in the Netherlands). Indeed, if insurane would not bemandatory, a ross subsidy (due to risk adjustment) may indue the net payers to forgo insuranethereby reduing the eieny of the insurane market. If risk adjustment is organized at the rmlevel (as, for instane, in the US with big employers) the sheme is usually so attrative (due to taxbreaks) that the assumption of full sale ompetition is not an unreasonable one. The advantage ofmaking this assumption is that the budget onstraint for hanges in risk adjustment an simply bewritten as (34).Assumption (35) states that if an inrease in ρ raises uh, then it dereases ul. This is a naturalassumption: as ρh inreases (ρl dereases) one expets insurers to ompete more for θh types (ompeteless for θl types) and hene uh inreases (ul dereases). We are espeially interested here in the (L)22
equilibrium. Lemma 4 in the appendix veries that for the example above this assumption is indeedsatised.22We further motivate this assumption in two ways. The rst is to assume that the planner hoosing











have opposite signs. In words, the planner hooses a value of ρ that plaes theinsurane on the Pareto frontier in (uh, ul) spae. Put dierently, if a hange in ρ an raise the utilityof both types, the planner exhausts suh possibilities. Then, at the margin, there is trade o between
uh and ul.The seond way to motivate inequality (35) is in terms of equilibrium seletion. In partiular,assumption 5 rules out that there exists another equilibrium lose by in whih both uh and ul arelower.Lemma 2 Assume that




ũh < uh, ũl < ul|
√
(uh − ũh)2 + (ul − ũl)2 < ε
} (36)If assumption 5 holds, then for ε > 0 small enough, the set Bε(uh, ul) does not ontain anothersymmetri equilibrium.The assumption implies that in symmetri equilibrium the slope of a rm's demand funtion is notaeted by the level of u. This assumption is satised in the Hotelling example that we use in thispaper.The lemma exludes the possibility that lose to the symmetri equilibrium uh, ul there would beanother equilibrium with lower values for both uh and ul. Clearly, suh an equilibrium would be moreprotable for both insurers beause a rst order Taylor expansion implies that
Π(ũh, ũl, ρ, ũh, ũl) = Π(uh, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + (Π1(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π4(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))(ũh − uh)
+ (Π2(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π5(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))(ũl − ul)
= Π(uh, ul, ρ, uh, ul)−Π4(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul)(uh − ũh)−Π5(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul)(ul − ũl)
> Π(uh, ul, ρ, uh, ul)22The proof of lemma 4 is given after the proof of lemma 2 below to avoid dupliation. That is, we rst derive somegeneral results in the ontext of lemma 2 and then apply these to the example in lemma 4.23
for ũh,l lose enough to uh,l; where we have used the stationarity onditions Π1 = Π2 = 0 and
Π4,Π5 < 0. And similarly for prot funtion Π̃. In this sense, assumption 5 rules out a loal multipliityof equilibria leading to a oordination problem between insurane providers.Now we an show the following.Proposition 4 Let uh, ul denote the utility levels for type θh, θl in a symmetri equilibrium. Assumethat the indierene urves p(q, uh, θh) and p(q, ul, θl) have one point of intersetion. Then the relationbetween uh and eieny is as follows:
• if qh = 1, a hange in ρ whih raises ql also inreases uh;
• if ql = 1, a hange in ρ whih raises qh redues uh.The assumption that the indierene urves orresponding to the equilibrium values of uh, ul rossone is by denition satised if (SC) holds. SC implies that any indierene urves ross at mostone. In the NSC ase, we need a bit more struture. In gure 1 the assumption is satised. In fat,the following reasoning shows that a model with more than one intersetion point will not be veryintuitive. In the (L) equilibrium, (20) implies that p(1, ul, θl) > p(1, uh, θh). Further, (C1) impliesthat pq(1, ul, θl) < pq(1, uh, θh). Hene, at the rst intersetion point (at qh) we have pq(qh, ul, θl) >
pq(q
h, uh, θh). To generate another intersetion point, we need again a swith in slopes pq(q, ul, θl) <
pq(q, u
h, θh) for q < qh. As the slope is related to the treatment hoie in our model with inomedierenes, this would imply that for q lose to zero, the low inome θh type deides to spend more ontreatment than the high inome θl type. This does not seem very reasonable.23Hene, in the ase where qh = 1 we nd that (at the margin) solidarity (with the unluky θh type)and eieny (ql) go hand in hand. In terms of the objetive funtion f(uh, ul) above: if the plannerdeides to put relatively more weight on the θh type (i.e. f1 inreases relatively to f2), she will hange









Figure 2: A hange in risk adjustment whih inreases q.higher by the θl type. Consequently, the utility of θh an only be inreased if qh is redued as otherwiseinentive ompatibility fails.Figure 2 illustrates this graphially. The lines A and B denote parts of indierene urves of a θland θh type. The intersetion of these lines gives the overage q of the type that has less than fulloverage. Given assumption (35), a hange in risk adjustment that inreases q has to shift the A urvedownwards and the B urve upwards. In the (H) equilibrium, the (steeper) A urve is the indiereneurve of the θh type. The B urve is the indierene urve of the θl type. The point of intersetiondetermines ql. Hene inreasing ql and uh go hand in hand.However, in the (L) equilibrium the steeper A urve is the indierene urve of the θl type. In-reasing qh then requires that the indierene urve B for the θh type shifts upwards. That is, theutility for the θh type falls. 7. ConlusionStandard insurane models, e.g. Rothshild and Stiglitz (1976) or Stiglitz (1977), predit higheroverage for agents with higher risks. We show that this predition no longer holds if single rossingis violated and rms have market power.In the health are setor agents with higher inome have lower risks and more insurane. Putdierently, the preditions of the standard insurane model with single rossing are ontradited by25
the data. We show that the negative orrelation between inome and risk an ause a violation ofsingle rossing. With a violation of single rossing, the empirial ndings in the health literature anbe reoniled with a standard insurane model.We show the poliy impliation of suh a violation of single rossing for risk adjustment. Thetraditional insurane model (with single rossing) views risk adjustment as a measure inreasing e-ieny as well as solidarity, i.e. overage levels are loser to rst best and low health agents are bettero. Without single rossing there is a trade o between these two poliy goals. This implies that thesponsor of the health insurane sheme has to be expliit about the goals of risk adjustment.From an empirial point of view, our paper asts doubt on the positive orrelation test: Given ourresult that separating equilibria exist in whih agents with higher risk have less overage (negativeorrelation), it is evident that the results of suh a test have to be interpreted with are. In partiularsuh a test annot be used to test for the presene of asymmetri information when single rossing isviolated.We onlude with a disussion of advantageous seletion. This an be modeled by assuming thatpeople dier in their preferenes for risks. If high risk individuals are less risk averse than low riskpeople, it an happen that onsumers who are willing to pay the most for health insurane are peoplewith low expeted health are osts. Hene oering health insurane with high overage is espeiallyattrative for agents with low expeted osts: advantageous seletion. The impliation of some ad-vantageous seletion models is that poliies that stimulate insurane overage are welfare reduing. Infat, there may be over-insurane in equilibrium. See Einav and Finkelstein (2011) for a reent reviewof advantageous seletion and empirial papers doumenting this in health are markets.In our model (in the (L) equilibrium), we also see that at the margin low risk types are willingto pay more for insurane than high risk types. This is aused by the fat that at less than perfetoverage, low inome, high risk types tend to redue expenditure on treatments. Basially, they annotaord the treatments that they need. Hene, although the equilibrium is an advantageous seletionequilibrium, in our model stimulating insurane overage (e.g. through mandatory insurane at fulloverage) is eient (beause of assumption 3).
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A. Proof of resultsProof of proposition 1 Suppose to the ontrary that qh < 1 in equilibrium. The ontrat (qh, ph)leads to nonnegative prots; otherwise it would not be oered in equilibrium. Denote by uh theutility level θh derives from (qh, ph) and by p(q, uh, θh) the indierene urve of θh assoiated with hisontrat. By assumption 3, the ontrat (1, p(1, uh, θh)) for type θh yields higher prots than (qh, ph).For ε > 0 small enough the ontrat (1, p(1, uh, θh)−ε) is stritly preferred by θh to (qh, ph) and yieldshigher prots than (qh, ph). If the ontrat (1, p(1, uh, θh)−ε) also attrats θl types, prots will remainpositive as those are better risks. Therefore, (1, p(1, uh, θh)−ε) is a protable deviation, i.e. a ontratwith stritly positive prots and demand. Consequently, qh < 1 annot be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.Proof of lemma 1 We start with the proof of the seond statement. Suppose both inentiveonstraints were binding, i.e. θh and θl are both indierent between the two ontrats. First, look atthe ase where qh, ql < 1. Call the utility levels of the two types under the equilibrium ontrats uland uh. Now take the indierene urves orresponding to these utility levels and all them p(q, ul, θl)and p(q, uh, θh) and dene ι = argmaxk∈{l,h} p(1, uk, θk). Changing θι's menu point to (1, p(1, uι, θι))will inrease prots by assumption 3. By the denition of ι, this hange is also inentive ompatible.Seond, take the ase where qk = 1 and q−k < 1 for some k ∈ h, l and suppose again that bothinentive onstraints were binding. But aording to assumption 3 pooling on the ontrat of θk wouldlead to higher prots. Hene, at most one inentive onstraint is binding.
qι = 1 follows from the argument in the rst step and therefore at least one type has to have fulloverage. Q.E.D.Proof of proposition 2 Dene ι = argmaxk∈{h,l} p(1, ūk, θk). By lemma 1, one type has fulloverage. Suppose that qι < 1 and therefore qκ = 1 with κ ∈ {h, l} and κ 6= ι. Note that theindividual rationality onstraint of θι annot be binding as otherwise θι would misrepresent as θκ bythe denition of ι. But then the inentive ompatibility onstraint of θι has to be binding as themonopolist ould inrease pι otherwise. By assumption 3, the monopolist ould ahieve a higher protby pooling both types on θκ's ontrat. This ontradits the optimality of qι < 1.If both types are pooled, the optimal ontrat will be (q, p) = (1, p(1, ūκ, θκ)) and the individualrationality onstraint of θκ will be binding. If the types are separated, the inentive ompatibilityonstraint of θκ annot bind: Sine qι = 1, pooling on θι's ontrat would lead to higher prots byassumption 3 if the inentive onstraint was binding. As inreasing pκ relaxes the inentive ompati-bility onstraint of θι, the individual rationality onstraint of θκ has to bind: Otherwise, inreasing pκwould inrease prots.Last note that inreasing pι would be feasible and inrease prots if neither the inentive ompat-31
ibility nor the individual rationality onstraint of θι was binding. Q.E.D.Proof of proposition 3 With single rossing, the solution (H) also satises (ICl) beause (SC)implies that
p(1, uhH , θ















), the solution (H) is a symmetri equilibrium.If single rossing is not satised, we need to hek that (ICl) in ase (H) ((ICh) in ase (L)) issatised. Using an equation similar to (37) this is the assumption given in eah ase. Q.E.D.Lemma 3 In the example depited in gure 1 (L) equilibria exist for φ > 0.Proof of lemma 3 We start with two straightforward observations. First, for φ = 0 the game hasthe unique equilibrium illustrated in gure 1: By assumption 3 ql = 1 is optimal and then the game isa standard Hotelling game with exogenous loation. Seond, an equilibrium will exist for eah positive
φ. This follows immediately from the existene theorem in Gliksberg (1952).24Now take a sequene of φn > 0 onverging to 0, e.g. the sequene {1/n}n=1,2,.... In the gamewhere φ = φn, denote expeted equilibrium utilities of type θl that are oered by rm j ∈ {a, b}by uljn .25 Sine ul is hosen from a losed and bounded interval (see footnote 24), there is a on-verging subsequene of ulan . With a slight abuse of notation we denote the elements of this subse-quene by ulan as well and ontinue to work with this subsequene only. To eah ulan orresponds anequilibrium value ulbn (assoiated with the game where φ = φn). Again there will be a onvergingsubsequene of ulbn beause ul is taken from a losed and bounded interval. Continuing in this waywe an nd a subsequene (uhan , uhbn , ulan , ulbn , qhan , qhbn , qlan , qlbn ) of equilibria onverging to some values
(ũha, ũhb, ũla, ũlb, q̃ha, q̃hb, q̃la, q̃lb).To prove the lemma it is suient to show that (ũha, ũhb, ũla, ũlb, q̃ha, q̃hb, q̃la, q̃lb) is an equilibriumfor φ = 0. From the uniqueness of the equilibrium for φ = 0, it will then follow that there are equilibriafor φ > 0 where ulj is arbitrarily lose to ul0 where ul0 is the unique equilibrium utility of θl for φ = 0.But then qh has to be stritly less than 1 (i.e. it is an (L) equilibrium): Type θl ould ahievea disretely higher utility than ul0 in a ontrat with full overage where the individual rationalityonstraint of θh holds (see gure 1), i.e. the inentive ompatibility onstraint of θl is violated if
qh = 1 and ul ≈ ul0. It is evident from gure 1 that partial insurane is possible for θh types and it is24The highest relevant utility level is the utility resulting if an agent gets full overage for free. The individual rationalityonstraint gives a minimum utility level. Consequently, the ation spae is ompat (this is obvious for q ∈ [0, 1]). Asprot funtions are ontinuous, the theorem applies.25If there are several equilibria, one an hoose an arbitrary one.32
routine to hek that these partial insurane ontrats are protable. Consequently, 0 < qhjn < 1 for nhigh enough.The last step showing that (ũha, ũhb, ũla, ũlb, q̃ha, q̃hb, q̃la, q̃lb) is an equilibrium for φ = 0 followsFudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 30) and is only skethed: Suppose, it was not an equilibrium. Thenthere is a deviation yielding a stritly higher prot for one rm. By the ontinuity of the prot funtion,however, this deviation would also inrease prots for (uhan , uhbn , ulan , ulbn , qhan , qhbn , qlan , qlbn ) lose enough to
(ũha, ũhb, ũla, ũlb, q̃ha, q̃hb, q̃la, q̃lb) ontraditing that (uhan , uhbn , ulan , ulbn , qhan , qhbn , qlan , qlbn ) is an equilibriumunder φ = φn. Q.E.D.Proof of lemma 2 To see what assumption 5 implies in terms of derivatives of the prot funtion
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h, uh) (44)Assumption 5 that duh/dρ and dul/dρ have opposite signs an be written as
sign(Π11 +Π14 +Π21 +Π24) = sign(Π12 +Π15 +Π22 +Π25) (45)Suppose by ontradition that suh a seond symmetri equilibrium would exist. We write
δh = uh − ũh, δl = ul − ũl where δh, δl > 0 are small sine by assumption (ũh, ũl) ∈ Bε(uh, ul). Usinga rst order Taylor expansion of Π1,Π2 resp. we nd
Π1(u
h − δh, ul − δl, ρ, uh − δh, ul − δl) = Π1(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + (Π11(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π14(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))δh
+ (Π12(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π15(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))δl
Π2(u
h − δh, ul − δl, ρ, uh − δh, ul − δl) = Π2(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + (Π21(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π24(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))δh
+ (Π22(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul) + Π25(u
h, ul, ρ, uh, ul))δlAdding both equations and using the assumption that both (uh, ul) and (ũh, ũl) are an equilibrium,we nd that
δh(Π11 +Π14 +Π21 +Π24) + δ
l(Π12 +Π15 +Π22 +Π25) = 0 (46)However, it follows from equation (45) above that the expression (Π11+Π14+Π21+Π24) has the samesign as (Π12 +Π15 +Π22 +Π25). Together with δh, δl > 0 this leads to a ontradition.Similar argument an be given in ase of Π̃. Q.E.D.Lemma 4 Consider the example with mean-variane utility and Hotelling ompetition. Then ondition(35) is satised in (L) equilibrium.Proof of lemma 4 With Hotelling ompetition, D1(u, u) = 1 as onsumers are uniformly dis-tributed on the line [0, 1].26 Hene D1(u, u) is independent of u and we an use equation (45). Followingequation (45), we need to show that
sign(Π̃11 + Π̃14 + Π̃21 + Π̃24) = sign(Π̃12 + Π̃22 + Π̃25) (47)In our example, the equilibrium indierene urves at their point of intersetion an be written as
p(qh, ul, θl) = F l(v(h̄, θl)− (1− qh)h̄) + (1− F l)v(1, θl)− ul
− 12r
lF l(1− F l)(v(1, θl)− v(h̄, θl + (1− qh)h̄)2
p(qh, uh, θh) = F h(v(h, θh)− (1− qh)h) + (1− F h)v(1, θh)− uh
− 12r
hF h(1− F h)(v(1, θh)− v(h, θh) + (1− qh)h)226More generally, if onsumers are distributed with symmetri density funtion g on [0, 1], it is also true that D1(u, u) =
g( 1
2
) is independent of u. 34
Further, qh(uh, ul) is dened as
p(qh(uh, ul), uh, θh) ≡ p(qh(uh, ul), ul, θl) (48)From these observations it follows that
pu(q, u, θ) = −1















































































dulaNow it is routine to verify that









< 0with Π̃24 < 0 from equation (39). Moreover









2twhih we will shown to be negative in every (L) equilibrium. Suppose this were not the ase, then
φ(pq(q





< 0 is the amount uh hanges if qh is inreased marginally while keeping ul onstant.The left hand side of (49) denotes the additional prots from θh types when marginally inreasing qhwhile keeping uh x. The right hand side of (49) denotes the marginal loss in prots if one redues
pl suh that a marginal inrease of qh with xed uh is inentive ompatible for the θl types: As
pu(q, u, θ) = −1 for both types, the neessary redution in pl is given by − duhdqh(uh,ul) > 0. But theninreasing qh keeping uh xed and adjusting pl to keep inentive ompatibility is a protable deviationwhenever (49) holds. It is stritly protable as the derease in pl will attrat additional ustomers from35
the ompeting insurer. This ontradits that the original situation is an equilibrium and therefore (49)annot hold.Hene equation (47) has to be satised in every (L) equilibrium. Q.E.D.Proof of proposition 4 If qh = 1 and given that the equilibrium indierene urves have only onepoint of intersetion (at ql) and are ontinuous, equations (19) and (C1) imply that pq(ql, uh, θh) >
pq(q
l, ul, θl). It follows then from equations (23) and (24) that a hange in ρ whih inreases ql raises
uh while reduing ul. Given assumption 5, the other possibility is that ul inreases while uh falls. Butthen equations (23) and (24) imply that ql falls. Hene the latter ase an be ruled out.Similarly, if ql = 1 and given that the equilibrium indierene urves are ontinuous and only haveone point of intersetion (at qh), equations (20) and (C1) imply that pq(qh, ul, θl) > pq(qh, uh, θh). Itfollows then from equation (27) that a hange in ρ whih raises qh must be aompanied by an inreasein ul and a fall in uh. Q.E.D.
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